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Key Kumho Tire Concepts

Posted on August 16, 2019 by Shawn Wygant

Read together, Daubert, Joiner and Kumho Tire make it clear that the trial judge is required to independently evaluate:

the reasonableness of the expert’s reliance on his data, and
the data underlying an expert’s opinion.

At PsychLaw.net, we teach that these are now preconditions to the admissibility of the evidence under Rule 702.[1] Although Daubert was a Rule 702 decision focusing on an expert’s methodology, the reasoning in Daubert is also relevant to Rule 703 issues relating to the data underlying an expert’s opinion because the two rules are interrelated. [2] Thus, appellate courts require district courts to act as “gatekeepers”, ensuring that the scientific data supporting the expert’s opinion are reasonable, valid and reliable.[3]

At PsychLaw.net we take note that as commentators Faigman, Kaye et al emphasize, the more difficult question that courts must face under Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho is: How dependable must expert evidence be to be good enough for admission?[4] Professors Faigman, Kaye et al go on to explain:

“In a nutshell, Daubert and its progeny–perhaps especially its progeny–brought the scientific culture to the courtroom. Judges are now expected to bring some critical judgment, informed by knowledge of the way empirical propositions are tested, to expert evidence admissibility decisions.”[5]

Indeed, Joiner instructs that conclusions and methodology are not completely distinct from one another. Trained experts often extrapolate from existing data, but the Court instructed that neither Daubert nor the Federal Rules of Evidence require a district court to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the word or subjective experience of the expert. As the Joiner court went on to explain, a court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.[6] As a result of these many explicit as well as implicit requirements, Daubert hearing are now de rigueur.

Key Kumho Tire Concepts:

TRIAL COURT Must have considerable leeway in deciding whether the proposed testimony and the proposed expert is reliable. 119 S.Ct. 1167 at 1176
TRIAL COURT Must determine both the validity of the expert’s qualifications and the reliability of the proposed testimony 119 S.Ct. 1167 at 1176 – 1177
EXPERTS Must demonstrate a valid connection to the pertinent facts as a precondition to admissibility 119 S.Ct. 1167 at 1174
EXPERTS Whether basing testimony on professional studies or personal experience, must employ in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field. 119 S.Ct. 1167 at 1176

[1] Daubert rejects the general acceptance test for evaluating reliability of scientific evidence and requires a 702 & 703 analysis Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2799, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469, 485 (1993).

[2] Daubert reliability standards apply to data issues arising under Rule 703. See: In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig. 35 F.3d 717, 748-749 (3d Cir. 1994) cert. denied 513 U.S. 1090 (1995) (applying same standard avoids need of making metaphysical distinctions between problems with underlying data itself as opposed to problems with the methods used to analyze the data).

[3] For early examples of the Judge as gatekeeper in evaluating an expert and the expert’s data, See: In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig, 35 F.3d 717, 742 (3^rd Cir. 1994), cert. denied. 513 U.S. 1090 (1995) (gatekeeping role with regard to experts includes independent evaluation of reasonableness of the data relied on by experts under Fed. R. Evid. 703). See, also:

2^nd Circuit United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924. 938 (2^nd Cir. 1993), cert. denied., 511 U.S. 1070 (1994) (Daubert principles interpreting FRE 702 apply equally to FRE 703).

3^rd Circuit In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717. 742 (3^rd Cir. 1994), cert. denied. 513 U.S. 1690 (1995) (gatekeeping role with regard to experts includes independent evaluation of reasonableness of data relied on by experts FRE 703).

5^th Circuit See: Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 197 n.4 (5^th Cir. 1996) (Courts using Daubert standard for admissibility of expert testimony should pay close attention when expert witnesses depart from generally accepted scientific methodologies, because judge or jury may not be junior scientists, equipped to evaluate scientific innovation; Guillory v. Domtar Industries, Inc., 95 F.3d 1320, 1331 (5^th Cir. 1996) (it is the role of the district Judge as gatekeeper for expert evidence to exclude evidence tainted by farce or fiction).

7^th Circuit See: Porter v. Whitehall Laboratories. Inc., 9 F.3d 607, 614 (7^th Cir. 1993) (court properly excluded testimony not grounded in scientific method Daubert analysis).

8^th Circuit See: Sorensen by and through Dunbar v. Shaklee Corp.,31 F.3d 638, 650-651 (8^th Cir. 1994) (After a Daubert analysis the court properly excluded testimony because scientific basis of proposed testimony was too speculative).

11^th Circuit See: Raynor v. Merrell Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 104 F3d 1371, 1374 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“Daubert creates no obvious bar to applying Rule 703 as we have done in the past”; finding that trial court properly excluded proffered testimony under Rule 702); Ambrosini v. Labarraque. 101 F.3d 129,133-134, 137-139 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. dismissed, – U.S. -, 117 S. Ct. 1572 (1997) (as gatekeeper concerning scientific evidence using Daubert standard, district court must engage in preliminary assessment as to whether reasoning or methodology underlying testimony is scientifically valid and whether reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to facts at issue); Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 897 F.2d 1159, 1161- 1162 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 950 (1990) (pre-Daubert case in which court excluded testimony as without scientific foundation in face of wealth of published contrary data).

[4] Faigman, D.L.; Kaye, D.H.; Saks, M.J. & Sanders, J. (2000) How Good Is Good Enough?: Expert Evidence under Daubert and Kumho. 50 Case Western Reserve Law Review 645. See pg 652.

[5] Id. at pg 656.

[6]Joiner, 522 US at146, 118 S Ct at 519. The “ipse dixit” language of Joiner has proved popular with lower courts. See, e.g., Freeport-McMoran Resources Partners v B-B Paint Corp, 56 F Supp2d 823 (ED Mich 1999) The court found that the expert’s opinions are nothing more than his own “experience” and tied to each defendant through nothing more than his “ipse dixit.”

Evidentiary Reliability and Validity

Posted on August 6, 2019 by Shawn Wygant

Quoting from Judge Learned Hand in: Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 Harv. L.Rev. 40, 54 (1901), the Supreme Court explained in Kumho that experts of all kinds tie observations to conclusions through the use of “general truths derived from … specialized experience.”.^[1] To meet the validity and reliability challenge, the Court instructed that the gatekeeper:

Must have considerable leeway in deciding whether the proposed testimony and the proposed expert is reliable;^[2]
Must determine the validity of the expert’s opinion, qualifications and the reliability of the proposed testimony^[3] – and –
The proffered expert’s opinion, must demonstrate a valid connection to the pertinent facts as a precondition to admissibility.^[4]

It is our position at PsychLaw.net that the well prepared cross examiner will never overlook considerations of reliability and validity when dealing with mental health professionals.^[5] Issues of reliability may be compromised when mental health professionals are allowed to rely on the opinions of others when giving expert testimony.^[6] In some cases the sources upon which an expert relies for their opinions are of such little value that the testimony will not assist the jury in arriving at an intelligent and sound verdict. In such cases, the rule requires the gatekeeper to examine the reliability of an expert’s sources to determine whether they satisfy the threshold established by the rule.^[7]

Simply stated, validity involves correct application. We at PsychLaw.net define six kinds of validity in our glossary and explain that validity is the process by which we attempt to accurately communicate. Following Daubert many courts have laid down bright validity lines for admissibility:

Expert testimony is to be based upon scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact, not upon generally acceptable theory. Hopkins v Dow Corning Corp., 33 F. 3d 1116 (9^th Cir. 1994);
Expert testimony lacks sufficient scientific validity to be admissible absent scientific studies on expert’s theories, scientific peer review or general acceptance of theories or methodology. Sorensen v Shaklee Corp., 31 F.3d 638 (8^th Cir. 1994);
Expert testimony must be based upon scientifically valid reasoning. Expert’s belief on probable cause is not admissible in the absence of adequate explanation of how the witness’s expertise enables the expert to testify on the likely cause of injury. Watkins v Schriver, 52 F.3d 769 (8^th Cir. 1995);
The court may consider whether the expert’s theory has been tested, subject to peer review, published, generally accepted and has a known rate of errors. Peitzmeier v Hennessy Industries, 97 F.3d 293 (8^th Cir. 1996);
At a minimum, a recognized group of scientists in the field must accept the expert’s methodology as scientifically reliable.Lust v Merrell Dow, 89 F.3d 594 (9^th Cir. 1996); and
The court must determine that expert’s opinion has scientifically valid methodology which can be applied to the factual dispute. Allen v Pennsylvania Engine Corp. 192 F.3d 194 (5^th Cir. 1996)

Shielding the Jury from Prejudicial “Junk Science”

We at PsychLaw.net emphasize that like most other evidence, expert testimony is subject to Rule 403 balancing. The Supreme Court stated that because expert testimony can be both powerful and misleading, trial judges exercise more Rule 403 control over expert testimony than lay witness testimony.^[8] Following the Rules 401, 702 and 703 challenges described previously, the well prepared cross examiner can use the Daubert hearing and voir dire to attack proffered expert testimony on prejudicial grounds. In this way, the cross examiner asks the gatekeeper to employ a Rule 403 analysis that balances the probative value of an expert’s opinion, against the dangers of prejudice, confusion, and waste of time. This should also be done when evaluating the reasonableness of the data underlying an expert’s opinion [FRE703]. As a corollary, the argument must be made that the probative value of an expert’s opinion must outweigh its prejudicial effect under Rule 403 for the opinion to be admissible under Rule 703.^[9]

Scientific testimony often carries an “aura of infallibility.” Summarizing the literature, one respected commentator writes that:

“[t]here is virtual unanimity among courts and commentators that evidence perceived by jurors to be ‘scientific’ in nature will have particularly, persuasive effect.”^[10]

The cross examiner must call upon the gatekeeper to use a Rule 403 analysis of the proposed testimony as it may tend to confuse and often uses prejudicial language.^[11] Also, mental health professionals may speak to statistical analysis of their data and the cross examiner must be on guard against unfair prejudice in the language that is used in these situations.^[12]

We at PsychLaw.net emphasize the necessity of shielding jurors from “junk science” by using the Rules and decisional law to aid the gatekeeper in making these important evidentiary rulings. Consider a well-known study published in 1973 that found no connection between asbestos and mesothelioma. Mesothelioma is the cruel form of lung cancer that we now know is linked uniquely to asbestos. The study found no connection because, in a review of mortality among retirees from 26 asbestos plants, only one retired worker had died of mesothelioma. The problem was that most of the workers who contracted mesothelioma, and many did, died before reaching retirement age. Consequently, the study included data obtained only from healthy workers. Despite this glaring flaw, this peer-reviewed, published study was not retracted until six years later.^[13]

It is true that effective cross-examination may prevent misleading a jury. Nonetheless, we at PsychLaw.net recommend getting the job done before a jury is ever seated.^[14]

The Problem of Creeping Hearsay.

As Federal Rule of Evidence 703 does not require the facts or data the expert relies upon to be admitted into evidence,^[15] the cross examiner must work diligently to accomplish a Rule 703 “reasonable reliance,” and Rule 403 “more prejudicial than probative,” showing before trial. Certainly, mental health professional rely on much that may not be admissible. The problem for the cross examiner is that these same professionals, when called to testify, believe that this portion of the evidence rule creates a via regia for hearsay.^[16]

While the Rule does not require personal knowledge and allows experts to form opinions on the basis of data that may otherwise be inadmissible, the cross examiner must guard against the use of 703 as akin to a hearsay exception. We at PsychLaw.net teach that the best way to manage this difficult task is with a demand for full disclosure. Next, careful scrutiny of the data relied upon for reliability, validity and trustworthiness, must be accomplished.^[17] In this way, prejudicial hearsay, which may otherwise creep into the record, may be bared at the door.

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[1]. Kumho Tire Company, Ltd. v Carmichael, ___ U. S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 1167,at 1174; 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999).

[2]. Id. at 119 S.Ct. 1167 at 1176.

[3]. Id. at 119 S.Ct. 1167 at 1176 – 1177.

[4]. Id. at 119 S.Ct. 1167 at 1174.

[5]. For example, see: Baumholser v Amax Coal Co., 630 F.2d 550, 553 (7^th Cir. 1980) Where the reviewing court found no prejudicial error when trial judge improperly admitted geology survey relied on by expert because the trial judge allowed extensive cross-examination on reliability and the opponents produced their own experts to testify on issue. See, also: TK-7 Corp. v. Estate of Barbouti, 993. F. 2d 722, 732- 733 (10^th Cir. 1993) Where an expert was not allowed to rely on opinions of other experts because his unfamiliarity with methods and reasons underlying other expert’s conclusions precluded effective cross-examination concerning reliability.

[6]. Kibert v Peyton, 383 F.2d 566 (4^th Cir. 1967) An expert witness is permitted to take into account the testimony of others as to what they observed; United States v. 1,014.16 Acres of Land, 558 F. Supp. 1238, 1242 (W.D. Mo. 1983), aff”d, 739 F.2d 1371 (8^th Cir.1984) An expert is allowed to rely on, among other things, opinions of other experts.

[7]. See, i.e.: Slaughter v Southern Talc Co., 919 F.2d 304 (5^th Cir. 1990).

[8]. See, i.e.: Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 509 U.S. 579; 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2798 (1993) quoting J. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (1991).

[9]. For examples of expert testimony being subject to Rule 403 analysis. See, i.e.: Emigh v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 710 F. Supp. 608, 612 (W.D. Pa. 1989) Where the court held that Fed. R. Evid. 703 may not be used as “backdoor” to get evidence before jury. For more examples of unfair prejudice, see. i.e.:

1st Circuit – See, e.g., Lynch v. Merrell-Nat’l Labs. Div. of Richardson-Merrell. Inc., 646 F. Supp. 856, 866-867 (D. Mass. 1986). aff’d, 830 F.2d 1190 (1^st Cir. 1987) The court ruled that studies of analogous chemical structures relied on by plaintiffs’ experts could not be used to show causation. because of their highly speculative nature; citing Fed. R. Evid. 401-403. 703.

2d Circuit – See, e.g., Shatkin v. McDonnel-Douglas Corp., 727 F.2d 202. 208 (2^nd Cir. 1984) The trial court excluded opinion based on assumptions so unrealistic and contradictory as to suggest bad faith; citing Fed. R. Evid. 403, 703; Mathie v. Fries, 935 F. Supp. 1284, 1295 1296 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). aff’d and modified on other grounds, 121 F.3d 808 (2^nd Cir. 1997) Where evidence of rape-trauma syndrome, although generally accepted in relevant scientific community, was seen to be inadmissible when offered merely to prove that sexual assault took place or to bolster witness’s credibility. because potential value of evidence was outweighed by undue prejudice to defendant.

7th Circuit – See, e.g., Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 847 F.2d 1261, 1270-1271 (7^th Cir. 1988) Where the court used Fed. R. Evid. 403 analysis to exclude expert opinion under Fed. R. Evid. 703.

[10]. McCormick, et al., (1995) Evidence § 203, at 876. See, also: Strong, J. W. (1992). Language and Logic in Expert Testimony Limiting Expert Testimony by Restrictions of Function, Reliability, and Form, 71 OR. L. Rev. 349, 361; and see: Vidmar, N.J. & Schuller, R.A. (1989). Juries and Expert Evidence: Social Framework Testimony, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 133, 166 (footnote omitted); also see e.g., Commonwealth v. Garcia, 588 A.2d 951, 955 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 604 A.2d 248 (Pa. 1992) Instructing that “Jurors are human and may be unduly impressed by an expert, his credentials, and ultimately his opinion, ‘even though, upon reflection, they would realize that in the particular field under discussion they are as much at home as the expert.’”.

[11]. Courts rely on Rule 403 to exclude opinions which are couched in terms that may be clearly prejudicial even though the gist of the opinion is admissible. A judge might, for instance, find the terms “voiceprint” or “DNA print” objectionable as suggesting an analogy to fingerprints that might cause a juror to overvalue the worth of the expert’s opinion. In cases involving allegations of child sexual abuse, experts are fond of describing a child’s story as a “disclosure” so as to lend credibility to the expert’s sense that abuse really happened.

[12]. Courts have relied on Rule 403 when they fear that statements of statistical probability might be over persuasive and thus prejudice the jury. In United States v. Massey, 594 F.2d 676, 680 (8^th Cir. 1979) for example, the court reversed on the basis of plain error. The prosecution’s expert witness who identified a hair sample as identical to one taken from the defendant testified to some statistical probabilities as to which no foundation had been established.

[13]. See Sharon Begley, The Meaning of Junk Science, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 22, 1993, at 64. See, also: Faigman,D. L. (1989). To Have and Have Not: Assessing theValue of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 Emory L.J. 1005.

[14]. One of the real problems with waiting until trial is illustrated in these holdings:

United States v. L.E. Cooke Co., 991 F.2d 336, 342 (6^th Cir. 1993) The reviewing court ruled that the exclusion of testimony due to the danger of misleading the jury was not a ground for reversal because the opposing party had an opportunity to refute testimony during cross-examination; and see: Singer Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 579 F.2d 433, 443 (8^th Cir. 1978) Where the trial court refused to strike expert testimony as unsupported speculation on the ground that it was for the jury to value the worth of the opinion with the assistance of vigorous cross-examination.

[15]. Underlying facts or data need not be admissible. See, i.e.:

3d Circuit – See, e.g., United States v. Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 587, 590 (3^rd Cir. 1989) Expert testimony decoding intercepted telephone conversations, some in foreign language, was admissible even though some of expert’s conclusions drawn from material not in evidence.

5th Circuit – See, e.g., Marcel v. Placid Oil Co., 11 F.3d 563, 567-568 (5^th Cir. 1994) Experts may rely on hearsay if data is reliable and otherwise qualifies under Fed. R. Evid. 703.

7th Circuit – See, e.g., Finchum v. Ford Motor Co., 57 F.3d 526, 531-532 (7^th Cir. 1995) A Plaintiff’s expert was entitled to rely on published article about occupant safety during rear impact collision although article itself was inadmissible hearsay; and Baumholser v. Amax Coal Co., 630 F.2d 550, 553 (7^th Cir. 1980) Where an expert was entitled to rely on hearsay evidence to support his opinion. But the evidence itself should not have been admitted; see also United States v. Madoch, 935 F. Supp. 965, 972-974 (N.D. 111. 1996) Where a psychiatrist evaluating the defendant on court order was entitled to rely on defendant’s self-report of physical and emotional abuse in reaching her diagnosis although the statements were hearsay. The court went on to rule that the statements the psychiatrist “reasonably relied upon in reaching [ her] opinion may be disclosed to the jury to help the jury understand and evaluate” its basis because Seventh Circuit admits all statements made for purpose of medical diagnosis. To either treating or nontreating physicians, to same extent whether applying Fed. R. Evid. 703 or Fed. R. Evid. 803(4).

8th Circuit – See. e.g., South Cent. Petroleum, Inc. v. Long Bros. Oil Co., 974 F.2d 1015, 1018-1019 (8^th Cir. 1992) The district court properly allowed an expert to rely on information obtained from a commercial production service that received its information from the state, which in turn received its information from a well operator, even though the underlying data was inadmissible.

9th Circuit – See, e.g., Doe v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 971 F.2d 375, 385-386 (9^th Cir.1992) The district court abused its discretion in excluding affidavits of plaintiffs’ three experts on ground that their opinions were not based on “any facts within affiant’s personal knowledge.”

10th Circuit – See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 40 F.3d 1069. 1075 (10^th Cir. 1994).cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1088 (1995) It was proper for an expert to rely on technicians and their notes.

11th Circuit – See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Luisvilie v. Lustig,. 96 F.3d 1554, 1576 (11^th Cir. 1996) Experts may rely on hearsay evidence in forming their opinions; United States v. Chandler, 950 F. Supp. 1545, 1565-1566 (N.D. Ala. 1996) An expert in drug trade was entitled to form and testify to opinions based on inadmissible facts, including hearsay.

[16]. Here are some recent examples of hearsay as the basis for testimony:

2d Circuit – See. e.g., New York State Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956. 961 (2^nd Cir.). cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1150 (1983) An expert’s opinion based on out-of-court statements obtained for purpose of enabling expert to express opinion was admissible.

3d Circuit – See, e.g., United States v. Scarfo, 711 F. Supp. 1315, 1344-1345 (E.D. Pa. 1989). aff’d, 910 F.2d 1084 (3^rd Cir. 1990) The trial court allowed the prosecution expert in racketeering trial, to express an opinion on cause and time of murder victim’s death.,where the expert relied on findings of medical examiner.

5th Circuit – See, e.g., Marcel v. Placid Oil Co., 11 F.3d 563, 567-568 (5^th Cir. 1994) Experts generally may rely on hearsay, such as study, if data is reliable and qualifies under Fed. R. Evid. 703.

7th Circuit – See. e.g., United States v. Brown, 7 F.3d 648, 653 (7^th Cir. 1993) A witness properly based his opinion on types of evidence relied on by experts in narcotics, specifically, his examination of physical evidence and police reports.

8th Circuit – See. e.g., South Cent. Petroleum, Inc. v. LongBros. Oil Co., 974 F.2d 1015, 1018-1019 (8^th Cir. 1992) An expert was permitted to rely on information obtained from commercial production service.

9th Circuit – See, e.g., Doe v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 971 F.2d 375, 385-386 (9^th Cir. 1992) The trial court erred in excluding affidavits of plaintiffs’ three experts based on their knowledge of the medical literature.

10th Circuit – See. e.g., United States v. Davis, 40 F.3d 1069. 1075 (10^th Cir. 1994) It was proper for expert to rely on technicians and their notes.

[17]. See, i.e.: In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 285 (3^rd Cir. 1983), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) Full disclosure of the hearsay source underlying an expert opinion creates a foundation for an analysis of its trustworthiness and reliability.

The Importance of Voir Dire

Posted on July 31, 2019 by Shawn Wygant

As the Supreme Court instructed in Daubert: “the expert’s opinion must have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline.” 113 S Ct at 2796; 125 L Ed 2d at 482. Compared to lay witnesses, experts purport to offer testimony that is scientific; and the Court offered that the term “scientific” implies a “grounding in the methods and procedures of science.” Id. 113 S Ct at 2795; 125 L Ed 2d at 481. The word “knowledge,” the Court instructed, “connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.” Id. The Court made it clear that:

“…in order to qualify as ‘scientific knowledge’, an inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific method. Proposed testimony must be supported by appropriate validation – i.e., ‘good grounds,’ based on what is known.” Id.113 S Ct at 2795; 125 L Ed 2d at 481.

The Court’s instruction to the trial courts was that when “expert,” or “scientific” testimony is offered:

“…the trial judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule 104 (a), whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Id. 509 U S 579, 113 S Ct at 2796; 125 L Ed 2d at 482 emphasis added

At PsychLaw.net we remind that Rule 104(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that opposing counsel may voir dire a witness before the witness is permitted to testify as to his or her opinion. Questions relating to qualifications may also be pertinent to a motion to exclude evidence on the basis of Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Such motions would contend that the expert will not assist the trier of fact [FRE 702] and that the expert does not know the datum of his or her discipline [FRE 703]. At PsychLaw.net we feel that in order to aid to the gatekeeper, a good vior dire examines an expert’s qualifications, his/her knowledge of the datum of their discipline, and attempts to answer the questions posed in the previous posts. As the First Circuit informed: “…Voir dire is an extremely helpful device in evaluating proffered expert testimony….”^[1]^{, [2]}

Concerning the gatekeeper’s ongoing responsibilities, the First Circuit also held that Daubert was intended to liberalize the trial court’s discretion concerning scientific expert testimony. As a result, it laid down a clear expectation that the trial judges will make continuing sub silentio rulings on the validity of proffered scientific evidence.^[3] Speaking to the utility of voir dire and Daubert hearings, the Third Circuit has offered:

“[A]fter Daubert, we no longer think that the distinction between a methodology and its application is viable. [I]t is extremely elusive to attempt to ascertain which of an expert’s steps constitute parts of a ‘basic’ methodology and which constitute changes from that methodology.”^[4]

With these issues in mind, we at PsychLaw.net have appended a motion to conduct an extended voir dire together with a memorandum of law in support. This motion and memorandum directs the gatekeeper’s attention to the critical issues of evidentiary reliability, validity and “fit.” This is particularly important with mental health professionals because of the profound ethical issues involved. For example, the would-be cross examiner will want to use an extended voir dire, to inquire about:

1. Education
2. Training
3. Professional experience
4. Knowledge of the datum of the expert’s discipline
5. Research activities and Publications – and –
6. Professional Ethical Issues:

Credentials.

Through discovery the attorney conducting voir dire will work to describe the expert’s curriculum vitae and personal resume as thoroughly lacking in “fit” for the issues at hand. Occasionally, outright fraud may come to light. Falsehoods in the expert’s curriculum vitae and personal resume, will lead the gatekeeper to a conclusion there are falsehoods in the report as well.

Conflicts of Interest.

Conflicts of interest can provide a legal basis for challenge and court ordered disqualification of an expert witness. In Chapter Two of Cross Examining Experts in the Behavioral Sciences, we describe the conflict between treating therapist and expert witness. Also, a conflict of interest presents a viable area of examination which may go to weight later on by impugning the expert’s integrity.

Employment Beyond Competency.

An expert unfamiliar with the datum of his or her discipline or just out of their depth, will be exposed by careful voir dire. The goal is to show that the employment by the other side, simply beyond the witness’ experience and capability.

Improper Attorney Influence.

Pre hearing discovery is the best way to expose efforts by sponsoring counsel to influence the professional expert opinions. Normally such correspondence is not privileged in any way unless it is pure attorney work-product and was not relied on by the expert in forming a professional opinion. In the event the witness has relied in whole or in part on any of the data exchanged in communication with counsel, this information is proper for production and examination during voir dire.

Contingent Fee.

Occasionally, an expert will take a “bonus” at the completion of trial when a particular side is successful. This is sometimes found in civil rights litigation, where attorney fees are part of the recovery and padded bills are then affixed. Obviously if an expert’s compensation is driven by a contingency outcome, the objective orientation of the “scientist” is lost.

Creating Conclusions Before Research.

A meticulous file analysis may occasionally demonstrate that an expert opinion or conclusion was reached before any research was done. This is often found where the expert proposes to testify from “clinical experience”. As we illustrate in Chapter Three of Cross Examining Experts in the Behavioral Sciences, clinical experience often amounts to nothing more than speculation. When an expert’s testimony relies on little “more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation”, 113 S Ct at 2795; 125 L Ed 2d at 481 and voir dire exposes this inadequate foundation, the witness should be stricken.

Investigation not done.

Often, a close examination of a mental health professional’s time records, notes, raw test data, and/or file reports, reveals that a purported investigation was simply not accomplished. This is frequently found as an artifact of the anchoring biases we discuss in Chapter Three of Cross Examining Experts in the Behavioral Sciences.

Intentionally Ignoring Data.

Voir dire of experts frequently exposes their anchoring biases, and their overlooking the rule in / rule out problems, discussed in Chapter Three of Cross Examining Experts in the Behavioral Sciences. In particular, experts too often ignore relevant data. This may also occur when counsel or clients do not reveal all requisite data, or by the expert turning a professional blind-eye to relevant alternative hypotheses. This can be seen as an outcome of the PIASH effect.[5]

Use of False Data.

Falsified information in notes, testing, records, reports, or other basic data must be discovered and utilized in voir dire. We recommend meticulous preparation by counsel prior to voir dire, with special attention paid to the claims made by mental health professionals as discussed in Chapter Three of Cross Examining Experts in the Behavioral Sciences. This preparation will occasionally uncover a proffered expert so wedded to antiquated and anecdotal data as to render their opinions entirely unreliable.

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[1]. Cortes-Irizzary v Corporacion Insular, 111 F.3d 184, 188 (1^st Cir. 1997).

[2]. See, also: Faigman, D. L; Porter, E. & Saks, M. J. (1994). Check your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying About the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1799:

The Court has served notice that experts should trade in their crystal balls for electron microscopes. But the success of this move into the twentieth century largely depends on the law’s proper understanding of the crossroads at which law and science meet. “Becoming scientifically literate should prove to be continuing challenge to the law.” Id. at 1801 “It is . . . vitally important that a rigorous and thorough analysis of scientific data be undertaken before those data are admitted into evidence. This task is made difficult because of the general lack of scientific literacy among Americans, including lawyers and judges.”

There also is empirical data that suggests litigants express greater satisfaction in proceedings that allow their attorneys and not the presiding tribunal, to have direct control over the presentation of relevant evidence. See, e.g., Thibaut, J. & Walker, L. (1978). A Theory of Procedure, 66 Calif. L. Rev. 541. See also Lind, A. E. & Tyler,T. R. (1988). The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice; Thibaut, J. & Walker, L. (1975). Procedural Justice: A. Psychological Analysis.

[3]. See, i.e.: Hoult v Hoult, 57 F.3d 1 (1^st Cir. 1995).

[4]. See, i.e.: In re Paoli Railroad Yard Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 745-750 (3^rd Cir. 1994). The Court went on to opine that under Rule 703, the trial judge must make an independent evaluation of the reasonableness of the reliance by experts in the particular field on the particular type of data proffered.

[5] See, e.g., Campbell, T.W.. (2002). The piash effect: Psychotherapy-influenced allegations of sexual harassment. American Journal of Forensic Psychology. 20. 53-68 The post-event information effect influences the recall of ambiguous events open to interpretation. Applying data related to confirmatory bias, mood-congruent memory, source monitoring errors, attribution theory, and stereotyping demonstrates how psychotherapy can taint the memories of plaintiffs in harassment matters. Plaintiffs can be expected to express therapeutically constructed memories with genuine sincerity. As a result, cross-examination attempting to impeach plaintiffs as fabricating is ill-advised in these circumstances.

DAUBERT HEARINGS

Posted on July 23, 2019 by Shawn Wygant

Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) provides that preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, or the admissibility of evidence, shall be determined by the court. Under this rule, the court is authorized to hold an evidentiary hearing to make a preliminary determination that an expert is properly qualified, and that the expert’s underlying reasoning or methodology is scientifically valid and can be applied to the facts of the case.^[1]

Federal Rule of Evidence 104 (c) provides in part that hearings on preliminary matters, such as Daubert hearings, may be conducted when the interests of justice require.

In the exercise of its gatekeeping function, the Daubert Court held that a trial court must undertake a preliminary determination of whether the methodology of the expert’s proposed testimony is scientifically reliable. To accomplish this with the greatest judicial economy, and to avoid “junk science” creeping into the minds of the trier of fact, a Daubert hearing is the appropriate way to challenge an expert whose methodology is questionable.^[2]

At PsychLaw.net we believe it is especially important for the gatekeeper to distinguish between a number of meaningful issues:

Is this particular expert qualified?

Do the qualifications of this expert fit the facts of this case?

What is the scientific validity of the methodology the expert has used?

What is the scientific reliability of the methodology the expert has used?

What is the scientific validity of the underlying data the expert bases his or her opinions on?

What is the scientific reliability of the underlying data the expert bases his or her opinions on?

To what extent is the expert’s reliance on that data reasonable. These are analytically distinct concepts.^[3]

At PsychLaw.net we remind you that in answering these gatekeeping questions, the courts must evaluate the experts, their opinions, and the foundations for those opinions on a case-by-case basis.^[4] In conducting these hearings, the trial judge may rely on another expert’s evaluation of underlying data.^[5] Nonetheless, reliance on other experts must not eviscerate the judge’s gatekeeping role.^[6], ^[7]

For these reasons, at PsychLaw.net, we have shared Dr. Lorandos’ Evidence and Cross Examination videos which explain in detail how to use the basic foundational material to conduct a Daubert hearing.

[1]. See, i.e.: Smelser v Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 105 F.3d 299, 302-303, 46 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (LCP) 468, 1997 FED App 33P (6^th Cir. 1997);cert denied, 118 S.Ct. 67, 139 L. Ed.2d 29 (US 1997). When applying Daubert, the trial court resolves preliminary questions on admissibility of expert testimony under FRE 104(a), and must determine whether expert testimony reflects scientific knowledge, whether findings are based on scientific knowledge and derived by the scientific method. In Smelser, the trial court did not apply Daubert factors in admitting the testimony of a biomedical engineer and the verdict for a plaintiff in FELA suit was reversed. See, also: Watkins v Schriver, 52 F.3d 769 (8^th Cir 1995); Eagleston v Guido, 41 F.3d 865 (2^nd Cir. 1994), cert denied, 116 S.Ct 53 (1996).

[2]. See, i.e.: United States v. Vitek, 144 F.3d 476 (7^th Cir. 1998). The trial court held a lengthy and exhaustive Daubert hearing.

[3]. Curiously, one Circuit has rules that a trial judge may still fulfill his or her gatekeeper function without making an explicit finding that an expert’s underlying sources of information are trustworthy. See, i.e.: United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 938 (2d Cir. 1993). cert. denied., —U.S. —; 128 L Ed. 2d 365 (1994) The Second Circuit ruled that a finding or trustworthiness of sources was not required. This Circuit reasoned that although Daubert principle interpreting Fed. R. Evid. 702 applies equally to Fed. R. Evid. 703, trial courts retain authority and discretion to determine admissibility of expert testimony based on inadmissible evidence without having to conduct an explicit trustworthiness analysis.

[4]. See, i.e.: Soden v. Freightliner Corp., 714 F-2d 498, 502- 505 (5^th Cir. 1983) Fed. R. Evid. 703 requires courts to examine reliability of expert’s sources on a case-by-case basis.

[5]. See, i.e.: In re Japanese Elec., Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 285 (3d Cir. 1983), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.. Zenith Radio Corp., 473 U.S. 574 (1986). Proper inquiry is not what the court deems reliable but what experts in relevant discipline deem it to be.

[6]. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2793-2799, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469, 485 (1993); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation v. Southeastern Pa. Trans., 35 F.3d 717, 742 (3d Cir. 1994) Daubert clearly holds that Fed. R. Evid: 703 requires an independant gatekeeping role.

[7]. See, i.e.: Head v. Lithonia Corp. Inc., 981 F.2d 941. 944 (10^th Cir. 1989) It is reversible error when a trial court fails to make a preliminary determination that data underlying an expert’s opinion is of kind reasonably relied on by experts in field. And see:

1st Circuit: See University of Rhode Island v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 2 F.3d 1200,1217-1218 (1^st Cir. 1993) Fed. R. Evid. 703 does not afford automatic entitlement to proponents of expert testimony, and court must give careful consideration to any facts on which expert will rely to determine whether reliance is reasonable.

2d Circuit: See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Lit., 611 F. Supp. 1223,1246 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988) A guarantee of trustworthiness is seen when an expert relied on material of a kind normally employed by experts in field.

3d Circuit: See Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 682 (3d Cir. 1991) Case remanded because of failure of trial court to make inquiry and finding as to what experts in field find reliable when defendant’s expert based opinion of prospective profits on predicted sales rather than an available data of actual performance).

4th Circuit: See Wilder Enters., Inc. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 632 F.2d 1135,1144 (4^th Cir. 1980) Expert opinion testimony was properly excluded due when proponent failed to show that data underlying opinion was of type reasonably relied on by experts in field.

Evidentiary Rules and Motion Practice

Posted on July 16, 2019 by Shawn Wygant

At PsychLaw.net we know it is a matter of common knowledge that scientific expert testimony is offered in a very high percentage of American trials.^[1] The testimony of mental health professionals was first reviewed by the United States Supreme Court in 1908 in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). Muller was a landmark case dealing with social welfare legislation designed to limit the work day of women. These women typically labored in a factory or laundry up to ten hours. In this case, attorney Louis Brandeis accumulated a substantial body of medical and social science research demonstrating the debilitating effect on women and girls of working long hours. Brandeis presented this material to the United States Supreme Court in a brief defending Oregon’s limits on the number of hours females could be employed. As the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the legislation, it discussed Brandeis’ social science material. The Court declared that although they “may not be, technically speaking, ‘authorities’, the studies would nonetheless receive judicial cognizance.” Since that time, motions and briefs designed to bring the weight of social science research to the attention of the court have been termed “Brandeis briefs”.

In Muller v Oregon the Court made it clear that it wanted good quality scientific data bearing directly on the issues. Today, when any court is asked to admit expert testimony as valid science under Daubert, opposing parties may attack the proof as scientifically invalid or questionable by offering counter proofs.^[2] Because of the Federal Rules’ emphasis on liberalizing expert testimony, and the specific requirements of Daubert and Kumho, it is the job of the advocate to lay out the scientific issues for the court’s consideration. At PsychLaw.net we feel this is best accomplished in motion practice.

Nevertheless there’s a problem. As Mr. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in Daubert:

“I defer to no one in my confidence in federal judges, but I am at a loss to know what is meant when it is said that the scientific status of a theory depends on its ‘falsifiability,’ and I suspect some of them will be, too.” Daubert 509 U S 579, 113 S Ct at 2800; 125 L Ed 2d at 485.

The Chief Justice continued by explaining that trial court judges are expected to become “amateur scientists,”^[3] and warned that science is an “unusual subject matter” for the judiciary. He advocated that the courts should “proceed with great caution . . . because our reach can so easily exceed our grasp”.^[4] In any trial where scientific evidence is needed, the “great caution” that the Chief Justice recommends creates a duty and an opportunity for both the advocate of scientific testimony and the would be cross examiner. The duties and responsibilities created by Daubert and Kumho, to keep “junk science” out, and admit only scientifically reliable and valid expert testimony, are described previously in this chapter. The opportunity for the attorney advocating the evidence and the would-be cross examiner, is motion practice.

Rules 26(b)(4) and 26(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for the discovery of facts known and opinions held by experts. At PsychLaw.net we feel that discovery practice provides the cross examiner with an opportunity to understand the qualifications, grounding and foundational basis of proffered expert testimony. Similarly, Federal Rule Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(E) provides that a summary of proposed expert testimony may be obtained prior to trial and the “summary must describe the witnesses’ opinions, the bases and the reasons therefor, and the witnesses’ qualifications.” And Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(Z)(B) requires the report to contain:

“A complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefor; the data or other information considered by the witness in forming the opinions; any exhibits to be used as a summary of or support for the opinions; the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years.”

Today, the cross examiner is faced with a new evidentiary world, where the intent of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 is toward “liberal admission” of proposed expert testimony.^[5] These rule governed reports, and the additional material gained through discovery, must be used by the would-be cross examiner in motion practice. Doing so avoids the unhappy possibility of a trier of fact hearing some damaging “junk science” that forces the cross examiner to play catch up. For these reasons, we at PsychLaw.net are providing numerous sample motions each accompanied by a memorandum of law. We have designed these sample motions and memoranda to demonstrate an integration of the material in the text. They will also aid the cross examiner in directing the gatekeepers attention to important issues of scientific reliability and validity before a jury is seated.

As unprepared for an analysis of scientific issues as gatekeepers too often are, they are given broad discretion in evidentiary rulings^[6]. As a result, it is particularly important to rely heavily upon pre-trial motion practice and the hearings which should be granted under Daubert and Kumho. The would-be cross examiner of suspected “junk science” must bear in mind that trial judges are rarely overruled in these decisions.^[7] For these reasons, it is essential to ask for a Daubert hearing.

[1]. See, i.e.: Gross, S. R. (1991). Expert Evidence, Wis. L. Rev. 1113, 1118-19 Presenting the findings of a survey of 529 civil jury trials conducted in California Superior Courts in 1985 and 1986.

[2]. For example, see: U.S. v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844, 849-852, 42 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (LCP) 1175 (3d Cir. 1995) [A drug trial wherein the Third Circuit concluded that it was error to exclude defense evidence on lack of standards in field of handwriting analysis simply because trial court determined that the proof was sufficiently reliable to be admitted under FRE 702. The Third Circuit appellate panel concluded that expert testimony on handwriting analysis is clearly admissible and decided to apply Daubert in order to be cautious. As this was a pre Kumho Tire Company, Ltd. v Carmichael, ___ U. S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 1167; 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) case. Under the Daubert standard, the defense counter proof should have been admitted since “the same considerations that inform the court’s legal decision to admit evidence under Rule 702 may also influence the factfinder’s determination as to what weight such evidence … should receive”.

[3]. Id. 113 S Ct. 2786, at 2800.

[4]. Id. 113 S Ct. 2786, at 2797.

[5]. See, i.e.:Habecker v Cooperloy Corp, 893 F2d 49, 29 Fed Rules Evid. Serv 452 (1990) It is the intent of FRE 702 to endorse the “liberal admission” of expert testimony, and “liberal qualification” of experts.

[6]. Trial judge has broad discretion. United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126, 134 (1^st Cir. 1995) Trial court’s decision entitled to great deference).

1st Circuit United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126, 134 (1^st Cir. 1995) Trial court’s decision entitled to great deference.

2d Circuit See, e.g., United States v. Aminy, 15 F.3d 258, 261 (2d Cir. 1994) In an expert witness / testimony review, the appellate court ruled that it was not error to admit expert evidence that foil wrapping of heroin was similar to that used by known drug dealers.

4th Circuit See, e.g., Maryland Cas. Co. v. Therm-O-Disc, Inc., 137 F.3d 780, 783 (4th Cir. 1998) Daubert requires only that trial judge make a “preliminary assessment” of whether proffered expert testimony is both reliable and helpful; plaintiffs do not have to prove that assessments of their experts are correct, they only have to demonstrate that their opinions are reliable.

5th Circuit Snap-Drape, Inc. v. Commissioner, 98 F.3d 194, 197 (5^th Cit. 1997). cert. denied, – U.S. -, 118 S. Ct. 77 (1997) “The decision whether to admit expert testimony is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court and is reversible on review only for abuse of discretion.”

6th Circuit See, e.g., United States v. August, 745 F.2d 400, 407 (6^th Cir. 1984) It was not an abuse of discretion to allow a statistician to testify in a case alleging manipulation of blind draw system, that the system assigned cases to judges in intended random fashion.

7th Circuit See, e.g., United States v. Stevenson, 6 F.3d 1262, 1266 (7^th Cir. 1993) It was not error to allow a drug enforcement agent to testify as an expert on distribution amounts in narcotics case.

8th Circuit See Johnson Group, Inc. v. Beecham, Inc., 952 F.2d 1005, 1007 (8^th Cir. 1991) It was not an abuse of discretion to allow expert testimony despite the possibility that the expert’s testimony included legal conclusions.

10th Circuit See, e.g., State Office Sys. v. Olivetti Corp., 762 F.2d 843, 845-846 (10^th Cir. 1985) It was not an abuse of discretion to allow the testimony of a company president on financial records given the witness’s knowledge and experience.

11th Circuit See, e.g.,United States v. Burchfield, 719 F.2d 356, 357-358 (11^th Cir.1983) It was not an abuse of discretion to permit expert testimony on commonly used counterfeit-bill-passing techniques.

D.C. Circuit United States v. Gatling, 96 F.3d 1511, 1523 (D.C. Cir. 1996) The trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to admit or exclude expert testimony.

[7]. For some recent examples of cases wherein a request has been to overrule an admissibility decision on scientific evidence, see, i.e.:

1st Circuit See, e.g., United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1183 (1^st Cir. 1993) cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1223 (1994) Affirming trial court, both in its denial of motion in limine to exclude expert testimony and in its subsequent decision to strike testimony when cross-examination revealed it to have been based on inadequate foundation.

2d Circuit See, e.g., Andrews v. Metro North Commuter R.R. Co., 882 F.2d 705,707-708 (2d Cir. 1989) A forensic engineer’s testimony was improper when matters were not “beyond the jury’s ken”.

3d Circuit See, e.g., Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig. v. Monsanto Co., 916 F.2d 819, 855-856 (3d Cir. 1990). cert. denied, 499 U.S. 961 (1991) (Paoli) The trial court’s insistence on certain credentials to qualify witness was abuse of discretion.

4th Circuit See. e.g., Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 789 F.2d 10512, 1055-1056 (4^th Cir. 1986) An expert’s statistical evidence should have been excluded as unhelpful because it merely repeated common knowledge.

5th Circuit See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, La., 795 F.2d 1230,1233-1235 (5^th Cir. 1986) It was an abuse of discretion to admit testimony where expert’s assumptions had no reasonable basis.

6th Circuit See, e.g., CMI-Trading, Inc. v. Quantum Air. Inc., 98 F.3d 997, 990 (6^th Cir. 1996) The district court “is accorded wide discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence challenged as irrelevant”.

Foundational Questions Regarding Peer-reviewed Journals

Posted on July 9, 2019 by Shawn Wygant

This blog relies extensively on the data and articles found in the peer-reviewed literature for cross-examining mental health professionals. Consequently, at PsychLaw.net we feel it will be necessary for cross-examining attorneys to lay a foundation regarding the significance of peer-reviewed journals. We recommend the following questions for foundational purposes.

Dr. X, you would agree that the practice of your profession can advance no further than the availability of the basic research to support it — Correct?
Just as the practice of medicine depends on basic research in the life sciences such as Biology and Chemistry, the practice of your profession depends on basic research in the behavioral sciences such as Psychology and Sociology — Correct?
And practicing professionals such as yourself are ethically obligated to maintain a working familiarity with the emerging research in your field — Correct?
[For psychologists] – Ethical standard 1.05 of the 1992 ethical code for psychologists – “Maintaining Expertise”^[1] – states:

– [read] –

“Psychologists who engage in assessment, therapy, teaching, research, organizational consulting, or other professional activities maintain a reasonable level of awareness of current scientific and professional information in their fields of activity, and undertake ongoing efforts to maintain competence in the skills they use.”