Getting it Wrong in Forensic Psychology: Case Studies

Dr. Joyanna Silberg is a psychologist, Senior Consultant for Child and Adolescent Trauma with the Sheppard Pratt Health System, and Executive Vice-President of the Leadership Council on Child Abuse & Interpersonal Violence. She has written and edited books on child abuse and trauma and is a PA denier who frequently speaks and presents on the topic. Like Dr. Geffner, who will be discussed later on, on paper it would appear that Dr. Silberg is qualified to provide an opinion on PA. However (also like Dr. Geffner), savvy trial courts and litigators have revealed on numerous occasions that her knowledge or her methods or her familiarity with and reliance on the actual facts of the case were insufficient to enable her to provide reliable expert testimony. Here are some cases in which Silberg testified that demonstrate this that we at  PsychLaw.net have found.

Volodarsky v. Tarachanskaya, Maryland, 2006

In Volodarsky v. Tarachanskaya, a mother waged a years-long campaign of unsubstantiated allegations and alienation from the moment of the child’s birth.[1] Mother’s various claims included that the child would return from Father’s care smelling of smoke, hungry, and bruised, and that Father physically and sexually abused the child.  And with each new allegation, Mother unilaterally suspended visitation. As each allegation was returned unsubstantiated by investigating social workers, Mother continued to withhold visitation, and eventually the court ordered a psychiatric evaluation of both parents. Mother was revealed to have “little insight into her part in the current situation …, sees all of the difficulties as related to [Father],” and had no compunction against using the courts to interfere with his visitation.[2]

Mother hired Dr. Silberg, who seemed to confirm Mother’s allegations, perhaps to rehabilitate Mother’s position. Dr. Silberg testified to clear “evidence” that Father was abusing the child, and testified that “it is simply impossible to explain the level of symptoms that [Child] is suffering from …. [T]he child is seriously at risk of abuse,” and that the child’s statements were “so vivid and accurate that only real experience could produce these reports.”[3] After that testimony was presented, the cross-examiner could argue that Dr. Silberg may have violated the APA guidelines and ethical codes related to dishonesty, giving professional opinions about people they haven’t met, and bias.[4]

Father countered Dr. Silberg’s testimony with that of two experts. Shockingly, one expert testified that the child only reported abuse when Dr. Silberg, whom the child identified as “mommy’s friend,” was mentioned. In Volodarsky, the court found that Father was not sexually abusing the child.[5]

L.S. v. C.T., South Dakota, 2009

In the South Dakota case of L.S. v. C.T.,[6] Mother and Father separated when Child was just three months old. Child resided primarily with Mother in another state, and Mother began making allegations of sexual abuse by Father when Child was age two. Investigations were conducted by law enforcement and child protective services in both states, with all determining the allegations were unfounded. Just over a year later, Mother made new allegations of sexual abuse.  There were no other indications of abuse, and the second CPS investigation was returned “unsubstantiated.”[7]

Nine months later, Mother made a third allegation of sexual abuse, and this last was tried over three days, during which 16 witnesses testified. Mother testified that Child reported to her that Father fondled and “poked” at Child’s genitalia and that, when Child returned from visitation with Father, she would “demonstrate how she tried to resist the abuse by holding her legs together.”[8] On the other hand, a senior investigator who looked into these latest allegations of abuse testified that he had concluded after his interview with the child, whose statements varied and contradicted one another, “that there is a high probability that she has been led.”[9] 

This opinion was mirrored by another investigator, who had concluded that Mother was trying to “sabotage”[10] the parent–child relationship. The experienced investigator also testified Mother traveled to various law enforcement, child protection agencies, child advocacy centers, and medical personnel in South Dakota and Nebraska to find someone who would identify child abuse.[11]

The child also displayed other symptoms of alienation, including that she “could not indicate one good quality about her father.”[12] As this evidence of manipulation and alienation piled up, Mother hired Dr. Silberg who met with the child once, the day before testimony.[13] Dr. Silberg testified that per the “testing” used, Child’s scores were “literally off the charts”[14] in comparison to other children who had been sexually abused, and that Child was a “severely traumatized child with an inordinate number of symptoms of both trauma and sexual preoccupation.”[15] Dr. Silberg further opined that “it would be dangerous even for supervised reunification because the child presumes that the abuse must have been okay if nobody is saying anything to them about it.”[16]

It is likely that Dr. Silberg’s testimony would have been excluded if a proper voir dire had occurred.  For example, the prepared cross examiner could endeavor to show that Dr. Silberg may have violated the professional guidelines and ethical codes that require knowledge, using established science in the area of work, and prohibiting distorting evidence and intentionally misstating facts and bias.[17] Luckily, an experienced forensic examiner fully countered Dr. Silberg’s L.S. v. C.T. testimony. The trial court refused to sustain Mother’s latest allegations and ruled against the protective order Mother was requesting.[18]

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[1] Tarachanskaya v. Volodarsky, 897 A.2d 884 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006), rev’d on other grounds, 916 A.2d 991 (Md. 2007).

[2] Tarachanskaya, 897 A.2d at 889; Volodarsky v. Tarachanskaya, 916 A.2d 991, 993, 994(Md. 2007)

[3] Tarachanskaya, 897 A.2d at 891.

[4] Ethical Principles & Standards, supra note 47, at C, 5.01, 9.01.

[5] Tarachanskaya, 897 A.2d at 892-894; Volodarsky, 916 A.2d at 1001. Note that in addition to the potential ethical violations for which Dr. Silberg could have been examined previously identified, she also could have been questioned about her duty to minimize foreseeable harm. Ethical Principles & Standards, supra note 47, at 3.04.

[6] L.S. v. C.T., 2009 SD 2, 760 N.W.2d 145 (S.D. 2009).

[7] Id. at ¶ 6, 760 N.W.2d at 147.

[8] Id. at ¶ 9, 760 N.W.2d at 148.

[9] Id.

[10] Id. at ¶ 7, 760 N.W.2d at 147.

[11] Id. at ¶ 20, 760 N.W.2d at 150.

[12] Id. at ¶ 30 n. 8, 760 N.W.2d at 153.

[13] Id. ¶ 13, 760 N.W.2d at 148.

[14] Id. ¶ 13, 760 N.W.2d at 148-49. Note, the record is unclear but Dr. Silberg may have been describing Mother’s responses to Friedrich’s Child Sexual Behavior Inventory, which is not intended to make the diagnosis of CSA by itself.  The CSBI is a questionnaire, listing 36 behaviors, which are thought to be associated with sexualization.  It asks a parent to “Please circle the number that tells how often your child has shown the following behaviors recently or in the last 6 months.” Each behavior may be rated as: “never”; “once monthly”; “1–3 times monthly” or “at least once weekly.” William N. Friederich et al., Child Sexual Behavior Inventory: Normative and Clinical Comparisons, 4 Psychol. Assessment  303-311 (1992). In high-conflict families, use of the CSBI with one of two polarized parents is subject to serious concerns about validity and reliability. For a discussion of the various types of validity and reliability, see Demosthenes Lorandos & Terence W. Campbell, Benchbook in the Behavioral Sciences:  Psychiatry – Psychology – Social Work 359, 373 (2005).

[15] L.S., at ¶ 13; 760 N.W.2d at 149.

[16] Id.

[17] Ethical Principles & Standards, supra note 47, at C, D, 2.03, 2.04, 9.01. Specialty Guidelines, supra note 48, at 2.02.

[18] L.S., at ¶ 33, 760 N.W.2d at 155. See also Ethical Principles & Standards, supra note 47, at C, D, 2.03, 2.04, 5.01. Specialty Guidelines, supra note 48, at 11.01.

Forensic Use of DSM IV

The DSM‑IV clearly acknowledges its limitations when used in a forensic setting.  PsychLaw.net notes that the manual states:

“When DSM‑IV categories, criteria, and textual descriptions are employed for forensic purposes, there are significant risks that diagnostic information will be misused or misunderstood.  These dangers arise because of the imperfect fit between the questions of ultimate concern to the law and information contained in a clinical diagnosis.  In most situations, the clinical diagnosis of a DSM‑IV mental disorder is not sufficient to establish the existence for legal purposes of a `mental disorder,’ `mental disease,’ or `mental defect.’  In determining whether an individual meets a specified legal standard (e.g., for competence, criminal responsibility, or disability), additional information is usually required beyond that contained in the DSM‑IV diagnosis.  This might include information about the individual’s functional impairments and how these impairments affect the particular abilities in question.  It is precisely because impairments, abilities, and disabilities vary widely within each diagnostic category that assignment of a particular diagnosis does not imply a specific level of impairment or disability” (p. xxiii).

Quite clearly, DSM‑IV acknowledges that its diagnostic classifications are not sufficient ‑ in and of themselves ‑ for responding to forensic issues.  Therefore, it is appropriate to ask whether DSM‑IV can legitimately support expert testimony in a legal proceeding?  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert revises the traditional test for determining the admissibility of expert testimony.[1]  The Frye test previously required that expert testimony be supported by scientific principles or evidence generally accepted by the relevant scientific or professional community.[2]  A review of the previous discussion of inter-rater reliability demonstrates that the DSM-IV cannot meet that test.

As PsychLaw.net explained in previous posts, Daubert establishes FRE 702 as the test for admitting the testimony of an expert witness.  FRE 702 allows expert testimony into evidence ‘If [the] scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue …’

Summarizing: Daubert defines a four‑prong test for determining the ‘evidentiary reliability’ of a scientific theory or technique.[3]

  1. Can it be ‑ or has it been ‑ tested?
  2. What is its known or potential rate of error?
  3. Has it undergone peer review?
  4. Does it enjoy general acceptance?

PsychLaw.net notes that applying these four questions to DSM‑IV leads to rather sobering conclusions regarding its evidentiary reliability.  The unavailability of inter‑rater reliability data for its various diagnostic classifications creates enormous problems for DSM‑IV.  As a result, it cannot claim to have been appropriately tested.  Additionally, its potential rate of error remains unknown.  When evaluated against Frye criteria, DSM‑IV can claim general recognition.  The extent to which it is used by a broad spectrum of mental health professionals clearly establishes that it is generally recognized.  General acceptance of a procedure, however, necessitates that professionals agree in the conclusions they reach when using it.  Without inter‑rater reliability data demonstrating an acceptable level of consensus for DSM‑IV, claims regarding its general acceptance remain unsupported.[4]  In other words, the “popularity” of DSM‑IV does not necessarily establish its reliability.[5]

Cross‑Examining the Forensic Use of DSM‑IV

  1. DSM‑IV clearly acknowledges its limitations when used in a forensic setting ‑‑ Correct?
  2. In other words, DSM‑IV criteria are not sufficient ‑ in and of themselves ‑ for answering the questions related to this case ‑‑ Correct?
  3. And without inter‑rater reliability data, one could argue that DSM‑IV has not been adequately tested ‑‑ Correct?
  4. And without inter‑rater reliability data, no one really knows what the error rate is for DSM‑IV ‑‑ Correct?
  5. And without inter‑rater reliability data, it is illogical to claim that DSM‑IV is generally accepted ‑‑ Correct?
  6. In other words, the popularity of DSM‑IV does not necessarily establish its accuracy ‑‑ Correct?

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[1].       Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U S 579, 113 S Ct 2786, 125 L Ed 2d 469, (1993).

[2].       Frye v United States, 54 US App D C 46, 293 F 1013 (1923).

[3].       Campbell, T.W. (1993). The Daubert decision and its effects on expert testimony. Michigan Lawyers Weekly, Sept, 13, 1993; 5B.

-and-

Lorandos, D. (1995). Finding the right expert. In Expert Witnesses Beyond Daubert. Ann Arbor, Michigan. Institute for Continuing Legal Education.

[4].       Remember, in the words of one of the amicus briefs filed in Daubert, a brief filed on behalf of several Nobel laureates: “It is how the conclusions are reached, not what the conclusions are, that makes them ‘good science’ …”: Brief Amici Curiae of Nicolaas Bloembergen et al. at 22,  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (No. 92-102).

[5].       “Popularity” of a diagnosis or the popularity of a described Asyndrome@ has at times found junk science creeping into the courtroom.  Rape Trauma Syndrome and Battered Women’s Syndrome are two of these popular but scientifically difficult conceptualizations.  We refer to these syndromes as “suppositional science”.  They are essentially hypotheses that are untestable or inadequately tested, but they find their way into courtrooms because the underlying insights are seen as useful in formulating legal policy and treatment modalities.  See, for example: Faigman, D.L. (1989). To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 Emory L. J. 1005;  Mosteller, R.P. (1989).  Legal Doctrines Governing the Admissibility of Expert Testi­mony Concerning Social Framework Evi­dence. 52 L & Contemp. Probs. 85.

When used for the more limited purpose of shedding light on the mental condition and behavior of the victim, such evidence has an easier time with admission, although a number of courts are quite critical:

State v Saldana (1982, Minn) 324 NW2d 227, 230 [RTS is therapeutic rather than factfinding tool; it carries aura of special reliability and trustworthiness and is likely to overawe jury]; People v Bledsoe (1984) 36 Cal 3d 236. 203 Cal Rptr 450, 681 P2d 291,300-301 [RTS is therapeutic tool not test to determine whether rape occurred or victim is truthful]; State v Taylor (1984. Mo) 663 1-W2d 235, 238-240 [RTS is not based on sufficiently sound science for use in evidence]; State v Brodniak (1986) 221 Mont 212, 718 P2d 322, 329 [error to let expert testify on basis of RTS and conversation with complaining witness that she was not “malingering”, expert may not testify on credibility]; State v Black (1987) 109 Wash 2d 336; 745 P2d 12, 16-18 [RTS lacks, scientific reliability]; Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 688 F. Supp. 1072, 1075-77 (E.D. Va. 1988) [court held that RTS evidence is not a scientifically reliable means of proving that a rape occurred and therefore does not sat­isfy Frye test.  Court noted that expert=s methodology “bore little, if any, resemblance to traditional scientific or medical methodologies” and that probative value of such evidence is outweighed by its unfair prejudicial ef­fect, citing Rule 403].

But see: United States v. Arcoren, 929 F.2d, 1235, 1238-42 (8th Cir. 1991) [court upheld admission of evidence of battered woman syndrome to explain why witness recanted her testimony], cert de­nied, 112 S. Ct. 312 (1991); and  State v. Grecinger, 569 N.W.2d 189, 194 (Minn. 1997) [Battered Women’s Syndrome is valid science, and admitting such testimony in trial for assault and attempted murder after defense attacked credibility of victim was proper].  In Grecinger, a man was on trial for battery and attempted murder.  The court determined that expert testimony on BWS was proper to repair a witnesses’ credibility.

And see: Note, (1986). The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent, 72 Va. L Rev. 619, 647;  Mosteller, R.P. (1989).  Legal Doctrines Governing the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Concerning Social Framework Evidence, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn at 85, 101-02. & Morse, (1990). The Misbegotten Marriage of Soft- Psychology and Bad Law, 14 L & Human Behavior 595.[Research dealing with battered women and rape victims indi­cates that jurors are most likely to overvalue expert testimony that applies general principles to the behavior of a witness in the case.]