The recent case of People v. Banks[1] in New York demonstrates that reliance on “clinical judgment” is like “shooting from the hip”. Banks found trial judge Barbara Zambelli working her way through a complicated explication of clinical judgment and research based opinions. Banks is instructive because it involved a pitched battle over expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification and 1) the low correlation between a witness’s confidence and the accuracy of the witness’s identification; 2) the effect of post event information on accuracy of identification; and 3) research concerning the eyewitness identification phenomena of stress, partial disguise, own-race bias, and weapons focus. Here, we at PsychLaw.net find that expert Steven Penrod and his examiners made it clear that although there was a great deal of anecdotal information on these phenomena, Penrod was relying on research, not “clinical judgment”.
In addition to making a record, U.S. v. Daniels[2] from the Ninth Federal Circuit illustrates the importance of the cross examiner knowing precedent in matters involving clinical judgment. In U.S. v Birdsbill[3] and U.S. v White Horse,[4] two federal district courts and an appellate panel of the Eighth Federal Circuit undertook a detailed analysis of the “Abel testing” process used by some state sex offender programs. In both Birdsbill and Whitehorse the courts found the process developed by Dr. Gene G. Abel of Abel Screening Inc., of Atlanta, Georgia, to be unreliable. In Daniels, however, the clinical judgment which directed that the Abel process should be coupled with the polygraph and forced on California inmates was not seriously challenged. Without a cogent record to rely upon, the Ninth Circuit simply ruled that, “Abel testing does not implicate a particularly significant liberty interest…”.[5]
Another recent case of the use of “clinical judgment” involves a defendant’s expert testifying about his clinical judgment, which was manifestly different than the published research – even the research he alluded to! In Rush v. Jostock,[6] a defendant’s expert cited the DSM-IV for a sense that the Plaintiff was malingering. We at PsychLaw.net note that this expert also cited the research on spinal injury incorrectly and the case is an excellent example of the cross examiner asleep at the switch.
In this case, Sherry Rush was rear-ended by Tasha Jostock. Unfortunately for Sherry Rush, it happened in Minnesota.[7] Prior to trial, respondent admitted liability, so the sole issue before the jury was damages. Plaintiff sought to exclude testimony of the defendant’s expert, one Dr. Kazi, regarding “Waddell’s signs” and the DSM-IV concerning malingering. Plaintiff argued that Waddell’s signs were clinically insignificant in cases involving cervical pain; that in order for Waddell’s signs to be of significance, three of five must be present, which was not the case here; that defendants had never identified the DSM-IV as a treatise which was to be used in the proceeding; and that defendants had failed to qualify Dr. Kazi to testify about the contents of the DSM-IV. The trial court, in denying her motion in limine, declared that the issue was not one of admissibility but one of the weight to be given by the jury to Dr. Kazi’s opinions.[8]
The appellate panel instructed that the competency of a witness to provide expert medical, and in this case, psychiatric testimony, depended upon both the degree of the witness’ scientific knowledge and the extent of the witness’ clinical judgment from practical experience.[9] At trial the expert testified that he had examined the Plaintiff on two occasions. After the first examination, the expert noted that Sherry Rush displayed “two of five Waddell’s signs, which indicated probable presence of symptom magnification and functional overlay.”[10] Dr. Kazi conducted a second examination, after which he concluded that Sherry Rush displayed “one of five Waddell’s signs.” Kazi testified that Waddell’s signs are five in number and are considered signifiers of non-organic source of low back pain when three or more of the signs are present. This is incorrect, but the cross examiner missed it.[11] Consequently, Kazi testified that she was malingering with DSM IV language – Sherry Rush received zero damages for her pain & suffering.
At PsychLaw.net we find that another recent example of “clinical judgment” involves the psychology of perception. In Kilgore v. Carson Pirie Holdings, Inc.[12] the “wallpaper illusion”[13] was litigated in a slip and fall case. In Kilgore, a customer brought a negligence action against a department store to recover for injuries sustained when she fell while descending a stationary escalator. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee entered summary judgment in favor of the store, and the customer appealed. The Sixth Circuit panel affirmed the exclusion of the plaintiffs’ expert witness. The expert, who the defendants’ cross examiner was able to strike, attempted to explain that a stationary escalator should not be used as a stairway because the appearance of the risers creates an “optical illusion” that causes a state of disorientation dangerous to persons standing at the top of the escalator looking down. The expert relied on two sources for this position: (1) an article entitled, “Wallpaper Illusion Causes Disorientation and Falls on Escalators;”[14] and (2) his own personal experience riding escalators. When the cross examiner demonstrated that Plaintiff’s proposed expert did not know or understand what research or methodology the article was based upon and that he did not conduct any independent research on this subject, he was suspect at best. When pressed by the cross examiner, the proposed expert did state that he did “a lot” of research on the optical illusion created by the appearance of an escalator, but he could not refer to anything in specific. In fact, when pressed closely, he only offered the Consumer Protection Agency website, despite the fact that no information from that website was offered as an exhibit. Exposing the basis for the expert’s sense of the issue as his own “personal experience” found the appellate court ruling that the trial court was within its discretion in concluding that the expert’s testimony would not assist the trier of fact in determining the dangers of riding a stationary escalator, because the expert’s position was not supported by sufficient data or reliable methodology.[15]
Given all of these examples of experts spouting their clinical judgment in the courtrooms, we at PsychLaw.net feel that cross examiners should be gladdened that clinical judgment may indeed be the basis for striking proposed expertise. In numerous recent cases, courts have been reiterating that when a decent foundation has been laid, the trier of fact does not need to credit an expert at all.[16]
Footnotes:
[1] 16 Misc.3d 929 (County Court, Westchester County, New York, 2007).
[2] 541 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. App. 2008).
[3] 243 F.Supp.2d 1128; 2003 WL 256914 (D. Montana) January 24th, 2003.
[4] 316 F. 3d 769 (8th Cir. January 15th, 2003).
[5] Daniels, 541 F.3d 915, 926.
[6] 710 N.W.2d 570 (Minnesota App. 2006).
[7] Minnesota remains a Frye State. That means that foundational reliability goes to the weight that should be accorded to expert testimony, not whether it should be admitted in the first place. State v. MacLennan, 702 N.W.2d 219, 230 (Minn., 2005).
[8] 710 N.W.2d 570, 574 (Minnesota App. 2006).
[9] Id.
[10] Id. 710 N.W.2d 570, 573.
[11] See, also: Spine. 2004 Jul 1;29(13):1392. Nonorganic physical signs in low-back pain are described and standardized in 350 North American and British patients. These nonorganic signs are distinguishable from the standard clinical signs of physical pathology and correlate with other psychological data. By helping to separate the physical from the nonorganic they clarify the assessment of purely physical pathologic conditions. It is suggested also that the nonorganic signs can be used as a simple clinical screen to help identify patients who require more detailed psychological assessment.
[12] 2006 WL 3253490 (6th Cir. (Tenn.)) (Not Recommended for Publication).
[13] Shifts in the apparent depth of a repetitive pattern or texture occur when the eyes are fixed at a position in front of the pattern. Observations on this phenomenon, known as the Wallpaper illusion, have been made by sensation/perception research psychologists for almost three centuries. See, McKee, S. P., Verghese, P., Ma-Wyatt, A., & Petrov, Y. (2004). The wallpaper illusion revisited. 4 (8) Journal of Vision, 592; Kohly, Radha P. and Ono, Hiroshi (2002) Fixating on the wallpaper illusion: a commentary on ‘The role of vergence in the perception of distance: a fair test of Bishop Berkeley’s claim’ by Logvinenko et al. 15 Spatial Vision 377; Foley, J. M. and Richards, M. (1972). Effects voluntary eye movement and convergence on the binocular appreciation of depth, 11 Perception and Psychophysics 423.
[14] Cohn TE, Lasley DJ. (1990) Wallpaper illusion: cause of disorientation and falls on escalators. 19(5) Perception 573. The wallpaper illusion, can occur when a person with normal binocular vision views a pattern that is periodic in the horizontal meridian of the visual field. Escalator trends present such a pattern. Evidence is presented favoring the view that disorientation experienced by escalator riders is caused by this illusion. Possibly some of the estimated 60,000 escalator falls occurring in the United States each year are linked to it.
[15] 2006 WL 3253490 page 4-(6th Cir. (Tenn.)) (Not Recommended for Publication).
[16] See, e.g.: McWreath v. Ross, 2008 WL 4876872 (Ohio App. 11 Dist. unpublished): “We recognize that a trier of fact is not required to believe an expert giving the testimony.” citing to McCall v. Mareino 138 Ohio App.3d 794, 799, 742 N.E.2d 668 (2000) 2008 WL 4876872 *8. Smith v. Andrews, 289 Conn. 61 (Conn. S.C. 2008) “the jury is under no obligation to credit the evidence offered by any witnesses, including experts; even if that evidence is uncontroverted.” citing to Johnson v. Healy, 183 Conn. 514, 516-17, 440 A.2d 765 (1981). Harris v. Delta Devolpment Partnership, 994 So.2d 69 (La.App.1 Cir. 2008): “It is well settled in Louisiana that the trier of fact is not bound by the testimony of an expert, but such testimony is to be weighed the same as any other evidence.” citing to Williams v. Rubicon, Inc., 808 So.2d 852, 858 (La.App. 1st. Cir. 2002). 994 So.2d 69, 77. and Pisel v. Stamford Hospital, 180 Conn. 314, 344, 430 A.2d 1 (1980). 289 Conn. 61, 72. And see Grainger v. Wald, 982 So.2d 42 (Fla.App. 2008“A jury is free to weigh the credibility of expert wit-nesses as it does any other witness, and reject even uncontradicted testimony.”citing to Republic Servs. of Fla. v. Poucher, 851 So.2d 866, 871 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); 982 So.2d 42, 43.